Multilateral Non-Cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Vartiainen, Hannu ; Kultti, Klaus
Publisher:	Turku : Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Subject:	multilateral \| bargaining \| general utility set

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Series:	Discussion paper ; 19
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/233235 [Handle] RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp19 [RePEc]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012502973