Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

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Year of publication:	2010-09-17
Authors:	Chowdhury, Subhasish Modak ; Sheremeta, Roman M.
Institutions:	School of Economics, University of East Anglia
Subject:	rent-seeking \| contest \| asymmetric equilibrium \| multiple equilibria

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series Number 014
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642290