Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way Distortion

We analyze the choice of incentive contracts by oligopolistic firms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the first stage they exert cost reducing effort. In equilibrium the standard "no distortion at the top" property disappears and two way distortions are optimal. We extend our analysis to other informational, contractual and competitive settings.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Cella, Michela ; Etro, Federico
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia
Subject:	Oligopoly \| screening \| two way distortion \| incentives \| RD investment

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2010_28 2 pages long
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008799919