Oligopolistic Screening and Two-Way Distortion

We analyze the choice of incentive contracts by oligopolistic firms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the first stage they exert cost reducing effort. In equilibrium the standard "no distortion at the top" property disappears and two way distortions are optimal. We extend our analysis to other informational, contractual and competitive settings

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Cella, Michela ; Etro, Federico
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
Series:	University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series ; No. 28
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 1, 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1738920 [DOI]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014187146