On a Theorem by Mas-Colell
We consider anonymous games with a Lebesgue space of players in which either the action space or players' characteristics are denumer- able. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilib- rium strategies. This result, together with Mas-Colell (1984)'s theorem, implies that any continuous, denumerable game has an equilibrium strategy. In particular, the theorems of Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) can be obtained as corollaries of Mas-Colell's.
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Carmona, Guilherme |
Institutions: | Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
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