ON ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORS IF VOTING IS COSTLY
Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.
Year of publication: |
2005-05
|
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Authors: | Sinopoli, Francesco De ; Iannantuoni, Giovanna |
Institutions: | Departamento de EconomÃa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
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