On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

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Year of publication:	2003-07
Authors:	Talluri, Kalyan
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Subject:	duopoly \| equilibria \| revenue management \| discrete-choice theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771966