On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a markovian environment
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Zhang, Tao ; Zhu, Quanyan |
Published in: |
Dynamic games and applications : DGA. - Boston : Birkhäuser, ISSN 2153-0793, ZDB-ID 2581474-6. - Vol. 12.2022, 2, p. 701-745
|
Subject: | Dynamic mechanism design | Optimal stopping | Principal-agent problem | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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