On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a markovian environment
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhang, Tao ; Zhu, Quanyan |
Subject: | Dynamic mechanism design | Optimal stopping | Principal-agent problem | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Suchtheorie | Search theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Markov-Kette | Markov chain |
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