On price competition with market share delegation contracts

We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la Fershtman and Judd (1987)

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Lambertini, Luca ; Kopel, Michael
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 806
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4212 [DOI] 899016618 [GVK] hdl:10419/159645 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:WP806 [RePEc]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651698