On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation

We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those affecting the stability of price cartels.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Kopel, Michael ; Lambertini, Luca
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 807
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4211 [DOI] 100048971X [GVK] hdl:10419/159646 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:WP807 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651699