ON TECHNOLOGY LICENSING IN A STACKELBERG DUOPOLY
This paper finds that in a linear Stackelberg duopoly model, the follower is more likely to license a cost-reducing innovation to the leader than the leader is to the follower, regardless of whether licensing is in the form of a fixed fee or royalty per unit of output. Under fixed-fee licensing, the follower gains more from small innovations while the leader gains more from large non-drastic innovations. Under royalty licensing, the follower always gains more than the leader from an innovation. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University of South Australia 2004.
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | WANG, X. HENRY ; YANG, BILL Z. |
Published in: |
Australian Economic Papers. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 43.2004, 4, p. 448-458
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The sunk-cost effect and optimal two-part pricing
Wang, X. Henry, (2010)
-
Wang, X. Henry, (2012)
-
Strategic choice of channel structure in an oligopoly
Liu, Lin, (2012)
- More ...