On the foundations of ex post incentive-compatible mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yamashita, Takuro ; Zhu, Shuguang |
Published in: |
American economic journal. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Association, ISSN 1945-7685, ZDB-ID 2452644-7. - Vol. 14.2022, 4, p. 494-514
|
Subject: | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Theorie | Theory |
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