Prediction mechanisms that do not incentivize undesirable actions
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Shi, Peng ; Conitzer, Vincent ; Guo, Mingyu |
Published in: |
Internet and network economics : 5th international workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009 ; proceedings. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-642-10840-7. - 2009, p. 89-100
|
Subject: | Prognoseverfahren | Forecasting model | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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