On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hausken, Kjell |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 116.2012, 3, p. 504-507
|
Subject: | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
-
First will be last : equilibrium selection vs natural selection in a rent-seeking experiment
Vogt, Carsten, (1997)
-
On negatively interdependent preferences in rent seeking contests
Risse, Sina, (2010)
-
Rent seeking and organizational structure
Wärneryd, Karl, (2014)
- More ...
-
An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units
Hausken, Kjell, (2010)
-
An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units
Hausken, Kjell, (2010)
-
Hausken, Kjell, (1996)
- More ...