On the Optimality of Not Allocating
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Hernando-Veciana, Angel |
| Other Persons: | Michelucci, Fabio (contributor) |
| Publisher: |
[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
| Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
| Description of contents: |
We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit
|
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (14 p) |
|---|---|
| Series: | CERGE-EI Working Paper Series ; No. 514 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 1, 2014 erstellt |
| Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2468924 [DOI] |
| Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050576