On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Oyama, Daisuke ; Tercieux, Olivier |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 74.2012, 1, p. 321-331
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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