Only time will tell : credible dynamic signaling
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Starkov, Egor |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 109.2023, p. 1-19
|
Subject: | Dynamic signaling | Repeated signaling | Reputation | Attrition | Signalling | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game |
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