Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Pai, Mallesh M. ; Rakesh, Vohra |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 150.2014, p. 383-425
|
Subject: | Optimal auction | Budget constraints | Reduced form | Multidimensional mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint |
-
Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent
Mishra, Debasis, (2022)
-
Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
Burkett, Justin, (2016)
-
Optimal contracts for intermediaries in online advertising
Balseiro, Santiago R., (2017)
- More ...
-
Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
Rudolf, Müller, (2007)
-
Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types
Hongwei, Gui, (2004)
-
Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
Birgit, Heydenreich, (2008)
- More ...