Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Penna, Paolo ; Ventre, Carmine |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 86.2014, p. 491-509
|
Subject: | Game theory | Algorithmic mechanism design | Transferable utilities | Spieltheorie | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming |
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