Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
Year of publication: |
1996
|
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Authors: | Theilen, Bernd |
Publisher: |
Bergisch-Gladbach [u.a.] : Eul |
Subject: | Vertrag | Contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Unternehmensorganisation | Business organization | Arbeitsorganisation | Work organization | Theorie | Theory |
Description of contents: | Table of Contents [d-nb.info] |
Extent: | VII, 179 S. : graph. Darst |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Hochschulschrift ; Thesis |
Language: | English |
Thesis: | Zugl.: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 1995 |
ISBN: | 3-89012-507-7 |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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