Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models

Introduction -- Incentive Problems -- Basic Structures of Contracting Problems -- Discrete-Time Formulation I -- Discrete-Time Formulation II -- Contracting in Continuous Time: Time-Multiplicative Preferences -- Optimal Performance Metrics -- Contracting under Incomplete Information -- Career Concerns in Competitive Executive Job Markets -- Agency Problem in Weak Formulation -- Contracting with a Mean-Volatility Controlled Outcome -- Hierarchical Contracting: A Mean-Volatility Control Problem -- Contracting in Continuous Time: Time-Additive Preferences -- Contracting under Ambiguity: Introduction -- Contracting under Ambiguity in Continuous Time -- Information Asymmetry: Hidden Information -- Information Asymmetry: Adverse Selection -- Information Asymmetry: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.