Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Fuchs, William ; Garciano, Luis ; Rayo, Luis |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 82.2015, 2, p. 632-658
|
Subject: | Hierarchies | Endogenous principal | Optimal contracting | Double-sided adverse selection | Venture captial | Professional service firms | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Hierarchie | Hierarchy |
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