Optimal incentive contracts when agents can save, borrow, and default
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bizer, David Scott ; DeMarzo, Peter M. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial intermediation. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1042-9573, ZDB-ID 1053781-8. - Vol. 8.1999, 4, p. 241-269
|
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Sparen | Savings | Kredit | Credit | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Theorie | Theory |
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