Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Bizer, David S. ; DeMarzo, Peter M. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Sparen | Savings | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Kredit | Credit |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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