Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes : a characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dutta, Prajit K. |
Other Persons: | Radner, Roy (contributor) |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 4.1994, 4, p. 483-503
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
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