Pareto-efficient climate agreements
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Asheim, Geir B. ; Holtsmark, Bjart |
Publisher: |
Oslo : Statistics Norway, Research Department |
Subject: | Climate | non-cooperative game-theory | repeated games | weakly renegotiation-proof agreements |
Series: | Discussion Papers ; 505 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 531932141 [GVK] hdl:10419/192487 [Handle] RePEc:ssb:dispap:505 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters |
Source: |
-
Pareto-efficient climate agreements
Asheim, Geir B., (2007)
-
Compliance technology and self-enforcing agreements
Harstad, Bård, (2015)
-
Compliance Technology and Self-Enforcing Agreements
Harstad, Bård, (2015)
- More ...
-
Pareto-efficient climate agreements can always be renegotiation-proof
Asheim, Geir B., (2008)
-
Pareto-Efficient Climate Agreements Can Always Be Renegotiation-Proof
Asheim, Geir B., (2008)
-
Pareto-efficient climate agreements
Asheim, Geir B., (2007)
- More ...