Pareto-efficient climate agreements can always be renegotiation-proof
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Asheim, Geir B. ; Holtsmark, Bjart |
Publisher: |
Oslo : University of Oslo, Department of Economics |
Subject: | Klimaschutz | Umweltabkommen | Internationale Umweltpolitik | Pareto-Optimum | Spieltheorie |
Series: | Memorandum ; 2008,23 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 57881224X [GVK] hdl:10419/47281 [Handle] |
Source: |
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Pareto-efficient climate agreements can always be renegotiation-proof
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