Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sung, Jaeyoung |
Published in: |
Mathematics and financial economics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1862-9679, ZDB-ID 2389728-4. - Vol. 9.2015, 3, p. 195-213
|
Subject: | Moral hazard | Optimal contract | Hierarchical contracting | PPS | Vertrag | Contract | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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