Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sung, Jaeyoung |
Published in: |
Mathematics and financial economics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1862-9679, ZDB-ID 2389728-4. - Vol. 9.2015, 3, p. 195-213
|
Subject: | Moral hazard | Optimal contract | Hierarchical contracting | PPS | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Hierarchie | Hierarchy |
-
Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
Sung, Jaeyoung, (2022)
-
Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
Hubert, Emma, (2023)
-
Shaping incentives through measurement and contracts
Bonham, Jonathan D., (2024)
- More ...
-
On optimal sharing rules in discrete-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
Schättler, Heinz, (1997)
-
Corporate Insurance and Managerial Incentives
Sung, Jaeyoung, (1997)
-
OPTIMAL MULTI-AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS
Koo, Hyeng Keun, (2008)
- More ...