Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Tomala, Tristan |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 67.2009, 2, p. 682-694
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Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Kommunikation | Communication | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Theorie | Theory |
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