Performance measurement systems, incentives, and the optimal allocation of responsibilities
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Hemmer, Thomas |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 25.1998, 3, p. 321-347
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Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Arbeitsorganisation | Work organization | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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