Policies in relational contracts
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Barron, Daniel ; Powell, Michael |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 11.2019, 2, p. 228-249
|
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Mitarbeiterbindung | Employee retention |
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