A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lindner, Ines |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 35.2008, 3, p. 607-611
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Condorcet’s Jury Theorem | Weighted voting games | Majority games |
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