Present or future incentives? : on the optimality of fixed wages with moral hazard
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Macera, Rosario |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 147.2018, p. 129-144
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Subject: | Fixed wages | Deferred incentives | Dynamic moral hazard | Expectation-based reference-dependent preferences | Loss aversion | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives |
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