Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences
This paper concerns the provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model under present-biased consumer preferences. The preference for immediate gratification facing the high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Aronsson, Thomas ; Granlund, David |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 113.2011, 1, p. 54-57
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Public goods Quasi-hyperbolic discounting Redistribution Asymmetric information |
Saved in:
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