Quasitransitive social preference : why some very large coalitions have very little power
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. |
Other Persons: | Kelly, Jerry S. (contributor) |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 12.1998, 1, p. 147-162
|
Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Koalition | Coalition | Theorie | Theory |
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