Reconciling relational contracting and hold-up : a model of repeated negotiations
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian |
Published in: |
Journal of the European Economic Association : JEEA. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1542-4774, ZDB-ID 2118178-0. - Vol. 21.2023, 3, p. 864-906
|
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Stochastisches Spiel | Stochastic game | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
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