Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form

This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations.

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Year of publication:	2004-06
Authors:	Do, Kim Hang Pham ; Folmer, Henk
Institutions:	New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society - NZARES
Subject:	international fisheries \| overexploitation \| partial cooperation \| games in partition function form \| competitive equilibrium \| modified Shapley value \| Agribusiness \| Crop Production/Industries \| Environmental Economics and Policy \| Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety \| Resource /Energy Economics and Policy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2004 Conference, June 25-26, 2004, Blenheim, New Zealand.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2004 Conference, June 25-26, 2004, Blenheim, New Zealand Number 97792
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008802884