International Fisheries Agreements : The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Pham Do, K.H. ; Folmer, H. |
Institutions: | Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research |
Subject: | international fisheries | overexploitation | partial cooperation | games in partition function form | competitive equilibrium | modified Shapley value |
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