Regulation and wage bargaining

Dag Morten Dalen (Norwegian School of Management), Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr (University of Oslo), Espen R. Moen (Norwegian School of Management)

In many regulated industries labour uions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. We study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. Compared to the case in which wages do not depend on the regime under which the firm is regulated, allowing for endogenously determined wages has ambiguous effects on the regulatory contract.

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Year of publication:	May 11, 1998
Authors:	Dalen, Dag Morten ; Fehr, Nils-Henrik M. von der ; Moen, Espen R.
Publisher:	Oslo, Norway : Department of Economics, University of Oslo
Subject:	wages \| bargaining \| regulation \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes \| Collective bargaining theory \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten)
Series:	Memorandum / Department of Economics, University of Oslo. - Oslo : Department of Economics, University of Oslo, ISSN 0809-8786, ZDB-ID 2532549-8. - Vol. 1998/13
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	82-570-9175-8
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/90796 [Handle]
Classification:	J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518877