Regulation and Wage Bargaining

In many regulated industries labour uions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. We study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. Compared to the case in which wages do not depend on the regime under which the firm is regulated, allowing for endogenously determined wages has ambiguous effects on the regulatory contract.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Dalen, D.M. ; von der Fehr, N.-H.M. ; Moen, E.R.
Institutions:	Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo
Subject:	WAGES \| BARGAINING \| REGULATION

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Memorandum.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Memorandum Number 13/1998 24 pages
Classification:	J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652195