Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mookherjee, Dilip ; Tsumagari, Masatoshi |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 208.2023, p. 1-33
|
Subject: | Mechanism design | Supervision | Collusion | Extortion | Bargaining power | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Kartell | Cartel | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Regulierung | Regulation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Verhandlungsmacht | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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