Sweet lemons : mitigating collusion in organizations
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Negenborn, Colin von ; Pollrich, Martin |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 189.2020, p. 1-25
|
Subject: | Mechanism design | Collusion | Correlation | Asymmetric information | Random incentives | Asymmetrische Information | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Kartell | Cartel | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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