Renegotiation of joint venture contracts : the influence of boards of directors and prior ties as alternative governance mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Duplat, Valérie ; Klijn, Elko ; Reuer, Jeffrey J. ; Dekker, Hendrikus Cornelis |
Published in: |
Long range planning : LRP ; international journal of strategic management. - Oxford : Elsevier, ISSN 0024-6301, ZDB-ID 160984-1. - Vol. 53.2020, 2, p. 1-19
|
Subject: | Board of directors | Incomplete contracts | Joint venture | Prior ties | Renegotiation | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Joint Venture | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vorstand | Executive board | Vertrag | Contract | Board of Directors | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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