Repeated Implementation
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.
Year of publication: |
1997-04
|
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Authors: | Kalai, Ehud ; Ledyard, John |
Institutions: | California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences |
Saved in:
freely available
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