Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games with conflicting interests
Year of publication: |
1993
|
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Authors: | Schmidt, Klaus M. |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 61.1993, 2, p. 325-351
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem |
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