Reputation with one-sided monitoring : ignorance as a commitment device
Year of publication: |
July 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Monte, Daniel |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 144.2016, p. 18-21
|
Subject: | Reputation | One-sided monitoring | Commitment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Firmenimage | Corporate reputation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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