Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Che, Yeon-Koo ; Gale, Ian L. |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 1.2006, p. 95-118
|
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
-
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Che, Yeon-Koo, (2006)
-
Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions : money ain't no good
Rosato, Antonio, (2019)
-
Procurement design with loss averse bidders
Fugger, Nicolas, (2019)
- More ...
-
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
Che, Yeon-Koo, (2006)
-
Rent dissipation with differential lobbying costs
Che, Yeon-Koo, (1994)
-
Caps on political lobbying : the impact on total expenditures and total surplus
Che, Yeon-Koo, (1994)
- More ...