Rewarding improvements : optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chan, Jimmy ; Zheng, Bingyong |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 42.2011, 4, p. 758-775
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Personalbeurteilung | Employee appraisal |
-
Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
Giebe, Thomas, (2012)
-
Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design
Chen, Bin R., (2011)
-
Interim performance evaluation in contract design
Chen, Bin R., (2013)
- More ...
-
Rewarding improvements: optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation
Chan, Jimmy, (2011)
-
Rewarding improvements: optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation
Chan, Jimmy, (2011)
-
Cherry-picking in labor market with imperfect information
Feng, Shuaizhang, (2009)
- More ...