Rewards and penalties in an evolutionary game theoretic model of international environmental agreements
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Luqman, Muhammad ; Soytaş, Uǧur ; Li, Yafei ; Ahmad, Najid |
Published in: |
Economic research. - Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 1331-677X, ZDB-ID 2171828-3. - Vol. 35.2022, 1,1, p. 602-621
|
Subject: | Free-rider problem | international environmental agreements | pollution control | evolutionary game theory | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem |
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