Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Haubrich, Joseph Gerard |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. Press, ISSN 0022-3808, ZDB-ID 3026-0. - Vol. 102.1994, 2, p. 238-276
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers |
-
Behavioral agency theory : new foundations for theorizing about executive compensation
Pepper, Alexander, (2015)
-
An agency theory of the division of managerial labor
Ross, David Gaddis, (2014)
-
Dynamic capabilities : the role of board monitoring and managerial incentives
Asija, Aman, (2021)
- More ...
-
The sources and nature of long-term memory in the business cycle
Haubrich, Joseph Gerard, (1989)
-
Umbrella supervision and the role of the central bank
Haubrich, Joseph Gerard, (2008)
-
Haubrich, Joseph Gerard, (2008)
- More ...